Research

My research examines how regulation and disclosure shape social outcomes. Across three settings — carbon disclosure, mortgage lending, and healthcare pricing — I ask when transparency rules deliver on their promise and when they shift harm onto the people they were meant to protect.

Working papers

• Disclosing Carbon, Displacing Harm: Unintended Social and Public Health Consequences of Mandatory Carbon Disclosures

  R&R · Journal of Accounting and Economics

  Mandatory GHG reporting led facilities in disadvantaged communities to release more toxic chemicals — with measurable infant-health costs.

  with Scott Liao, Divyesh Rajendra Shah, and Helen Zhang

  Funding: Dobson Business and Climate Grant

  Abstract

  We investigate the unintended social and public health consequences of the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP), which requires regulated facilities to report their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. After the GHGRP’s introduction, facilities of GHG-reporting firms located in disadvantaged communities increase their releases of toxic chemicals more than those in non-disadvantaged communities, suggesting that resources reallocated toward GHG mitigation come at the expense of toxic pollution control and shift local pollution toward disadvantaged areas. The effect is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, for firms that cut more GHG emissions after the rule change, and in areas with lower local media scrutiny or voter turnout. Residents of affected disadvantaged communities bear significant health costs, including higher rates of low birthweight and infant mortality. Mandatory GHG disclosure can thus inadvertently exacerbate environmental inequity.

  Presented at: University of Utah, Cornell University, Georgetown University, Tulane University, Southern Methodist University, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen), Bocconi Accounting Symposium, CAAA Annual Conference, CSFN Conference, RSFE Conference, and University of Toronto

  SSRN

• Do Federal Fair Lending Regulations Mitigate Mortgage Discrimination? Roles of Internal Controls, Regulatory Enforcement, and Market Competition

  R&R · The Accounting Review

  Extending fair-lending protection to sexual orientation narrowed the mortgage-rate gap for same-sex co-borrowers, most where enforcement and internal controls were strong.

  with Scott Liao and Helen Zhang

  Funding: Gender and the Economy (GATE) Research Grant

  Abstract

  We examine whether and how federal fair lending regulations mitigate mortgage discrimination, using a rule change that expanded “sex” to include sexual orientation among protected classes. Comparing the interest rate disparity faced by same-sex co-borrowers in states without prior state-level protections (treated) with those that had them (control), we find a significant reduction in the disparity in treated states. The effect is stronger in counties with less competition, among lenders with effective internal controls, and in areas with stringent enforcement, and these borrowers also experience fewer rejections before loan approval. Fair lending regulations thus reduce discrimination when supported by effective internal controls and robust enforcement, and regulation and market competition act as substitutes in mitigating discrimination.

  Presented at: Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University, Minnesota Accounting Conference, McMaster University Accounting Symposium, Cyprus Accounting Conference, McGill Accounting Research Conference Ph.D. Consortium, University of Toronto Brownbag, National Taipei University Accounting Conference, and CPA Ontario Accounting Research Conference

  SSRN

• The Social Cost of Price Transparency: Evidence on Healthcare Payments Disclosures

  Working paper · Dissertation

  When negotiated hospital prices became visible, hospitals protected profits by treating more patients faster — and readmissions rose.

  Solo-authored

  Funding: TD MDAL Research Grant

  Abstract

  I examine the social costs of price transparency in U.S. hospitals. After states adopt all-payer claims databases (APCDs), which aggregate claims data and make negotiated hospital prices visible across insurers, hospitals see a decline in net revenue per patient. Overall profitability nonetheless stays stable, because hospitals offset the revenue loss by increasing patient volume and shortening the average length of stay. These operational adjustments are associated with significantly higher 30-day readmission rates, consistent with a decline in healthcare quality. Gross charge prices also rise, raising concerns about cost shifting from insurers to patients. The effects are concentrated among hospitals in competitive markets and those more reliant on commercial payers, while hospitals with monopoly power or greater Medicaid exposure show little response. The findings highlight both the cost-reducing potential and the unintended welfare consequences of price transparency reforms.

  Committee: Scott Liao (co-chair), Hai Lu (co-chair), Baohua Xin, Susan Feng Lu, JeeEun Shin

  Presented at: Aalto University, Stockholm School of Economics, University of Alberta, Singapore Management University, City University of Hong Kong, University of Toronto, Toronto Metropolitan University, EAA Talent Workshop, McGill Accounting Research Conference Ph.D. Consortium, and AAA/Deloitte Foundation/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium